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Abstract
Hardware-based mechanisms for software isolation are becoming increasingly
popular, but implementing these mechanisms correctly has proved difficult, under-
mining the root of security. This work introduces an effective way to formally verify
important properties of such hardware security mechanisms. In our approach, hard-
ware is developed using a lightweight security-typed hardware description language
(HDL) that performs static information flow analysis. We show the practicality of
our approach by implementing and verifying a simplified but realistic multi-core
prototype of the ARM TrustZone architecture. To make the security-typed HDL
expressive enough to verify a realistic processor, we develop new type system
features. Our experiments suggest that information flow analysis is efficient, and
programmer effort is modest. We also show that information flow constraints
are an effective way to detect hardware vulnerabilities, including several found in
commercial processors.
1 Introduction
Modern computing systems increasingly rely on hardware-level protection to provide
secure environments for critical software components. Protection rings are widely used
in practice to isolate supervisor processes from user processes. Recent hardware secu-
rity architectures such as ARMTrustZone [20], Intel SGX [2], and IBM SecureBlue [1]
aim to protect software even when the operating system is malicious or compromised
The complexity of modern processors inevitably leads to bugs and security vul-
nerabilities. Processor errata often include security bugs [13]. Previous studies found
vulnerabilities in implementations of Intel VT-d [40] and system management mode
(SMM) [39]. Vulnerabilities are found in safety-critical hardware. For example, an
exploitable bug was found in the Actel ProASIC3 [30], which was used in medical,
automotive, and military applications including a Boeing 787 aircraft. (cut to save a
line)
Since hardware design is error-prone, there is need for approaches that provide
formal guarantees about the security properties enforced by hardware. Unfortunately,
conventional tools for formal verification are prohibitive in terms of both verification
time and hardware designer effort. As a result, commercial hardware designers rely on
code reviews and best practices to attempt to avoid vulnerabilities.
This paper demonstrates that the security requirements of complex hardware secu-
rity architectures can be verifiedwith hardware description language (HDL) information
flow control in practice. Information flow control (IFC) is lightweight since checking
happens statically at design time, and it is comprehensive since it constraints the move-
ment of data throughout the system.
Using an IFC HDL, we design and verify a multi-core processor which emulates the
security features of ARM TrustZone, a widely used commercial security architecture.
TrustZone aims to provide isolation between trusted and untrusted security domains,
which it calls the “secure world” and the “normal world”. We show how to use static
analysis of information flow to check that the security goals of this architecture are
met. This is the first demonstration that information flow can be used to verify complex
processors implementing commercial hardware security features. Since other hardware
security architectures [2, 1, 34] have similar goals, the approach and findings of this
paper are applicable to a broader class of architectures.
Information flow is verified at design time by the security type system of the HDL.
Type systems offer some important benefits. Type checking is fast and compositional,
and provides a formal guarantee that the HDL code enforces the information flow
policy specified by the designer. Because HDL-level information flow verification is
done statically, it has negligible impact on chip area, run-time performance, and power
consumption. Verification time and programmer effort are also small compared to
model checking.
Recent efforts [18, 17, 42, 36] have applied information flow control to hardware
security. However, these tools have only been applied to single-core processors with
simple security policies. We study a multicore architecture with both confidentiality
and integrity requirements. Applying static information flow analysis to TrustZone is
not a straightforward application of previously developed techniques. Three significant
technical challenges arise:
• Prior information flow type systems for HDLs are imprecise in their reasoning
about packed data structures. We build on the existing SecVerilog [42] language,
but improve the precision of previous HDL-level information flow analyses so
that efficient designs can be verified. The new features add precise reasoning
about the security of individual array elements and individual bits in packed
structures such as network packets, whereas prior hardware-level type systems
[18, 17, 42] only allow one security label for each variable.
• Information flow analysis aims to entirely prevent certain flows of information, but
like other hardware security architectures, TrustZone has amore nuanced security
policy: code running on a trusted secure-world core is allowed to cause potentially
dangerous flows. The TrustZone architecture describes access control checks to
enforce its policy. Instead, we show that the main security goals of TrustZone
can be naturally expressed as information flow constraints. Further, we extend
SecVerilog with language-based downgrading mechanisms for declassification
and endorsement, and show that these features permit localization of design
aspects that might enable dangerous flows.
Despite the use of these downgrading mechanisms, we obtain strong security
assurance. In particular, our implementation enforces the property that in the
absence of operations by trusted cores, software running on untrusted cores
cannot learn anything about secure world state or violate the integrity of the
secure world. Hence, information does not leak unless trusted secure-world
software performs operations that leak information.
• Prior studies have used information flow to verify simple secure processors, but
this work is the first to verify a multi-core processor with shared caches, on-chip
interconnects, and a memory interface. Architecture extensions were necessary
to statically verify these features. To avoid checking complex invariants about the
functionality of the on-chip network, the memory response ports are extended
with low-overhead access controls. This extension prevents responses from
being accepted unless they originate from a trusted party. We also identify
a potential extension to the instruction set architecture (ISA) that would allow
trusted software to control hardware-level information flow downgrading.
Hardware designed with IFC HDLs is formally guaranteed to enforce the security
property noninterference. We demonstrate for the first time that IFC HDLs are also
capable of detecting security vulnerabilities in practice. We emulate security bugs found
commercial hardware including the Actel ProAsic 3 [30], an AMD Processor [13], and
several Intel Processors [40]. We detect all of these vulnerabilities with our approach.
We also implement a suite of six other security vulnerabilities to test the limitations of
HDL-level IFC.Wefind that only bugs that affect downgraded signals can go undetected.
Our TrustZone implementation uses downgrading sparingly, and we could not construct
an undetectable bug that affects downgraded signals in our TrustZone implementation.
We synthesized a multicore processor based on a commercial security architecture
and empirically show that HDL-level information flow control has minimal overhead.
The performance, area, energy, and design-time productivity overheads of HDL-level
IFC are low. Because verification is performed statically at design time, the hardware
overhead is minimal; the clock frequency, area, and power consumption of the verified
design are almost identical to an unverified one. The programming effort is also small.
The secure HDL requires annotations (security labels) for variable declarations and
other purely mechanical changes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the ARM TrustZone
architecture. Using TrustZone as an example platform, Section 3 describes how HDL-
level IFC can be used for security verification. Section 4 describes the language
extensions needed for verification. Section 5 describes architectural features that aid
verification. Section 6 presents the evaluation results. Finally, Section 7 discusses
related work, and Section 8 concludes.
2 ARM TrustZone Prototype
2.1 TrustZone Overview
ARM TrustZone is a representative security architecture that is used widely in practice.
Its applications include embedded systems and smartphones. TrustZone uses hardware
mechanisms to provide an execution environment that isolates high-security software
from low-security software. Other commercial security architectures [2, 1] also aim to
provide an isolated execution environment, so we believe the findings of this study are
applicable to other architectures as well.
TrustZone partitions the hardware and software into two security domains, called the
secure world and the normal (non-secure) world. The high-security software executes in
the secureworld, and the remaining software executes in the normalworld. The software
executing in the normal world is prevented from accessing data owned by the secure
world. Practical systems need to allow communication between security domains. For
this purpose, TrustZone assumes the secure-world software is trustworthy, and allows it
to access data in either world. The threat-model of TrustZone does not address timing
channel attacks, and the only physical attacks it addresses are simple ones that exploit
debug interfaces.
TrustZone isolates the secure and normal worlds by introducing a security tag, called
the NS bit. TrustZone uses control mechanisms in hardware that check the NS bit. Each
processing core stores the NS bit in a program status register (PSR) to indicate which
world is currently executing on the core. The Each bus master and slave that may be
used in the secure world is also extended with an NS bit. For example, DMA engines
and display controllers may have an NS bit. A core can switch its security domain by
executing trusted software called the monitor mode which executes with secure world
privilige. The monitor mode is entered by an explicit instruction or through interrupts.
The normal world cannot change any NS bits.
Access to resources is controlled based on the NS bit. The system (AXI) bus
appends the NS bit of the bus master to each transaction. Bus slaves inspect the NS
bit and prevent the normal world from accessing secure-world resources. For example,
main memory (DRAM) is partitioned into secure and normal based on address ranges,
and the NS bit is checked for accesses to the secure-world partition. TrustZone
protects debug interfaces by preventing normal-world debug requests from affecting the
secure world. Similarly, normal-world accesses to secure-world interrupt configuration
registers are disallowed. In some implementations of TrustZone, data from both worlds
can coexist in caches. Coexistence is permitted by extending each cache line with an
NS bit guarded by access control. Similarly, TLBs can be extended to store address
mappings from both worlds.
On-chip Network
Access Control + Arbiter
Normal Memory Secure Memory
NS Blk
...
NS Blk
L2 NS
DMA
NS
Debug
Debug
Request
NS I$NS
D$NSCore 0
CHK
CHK
NS I$NS
D$NSCore 1
CHK
CHK
AC
AC
Figure 1: TrustZone prototype implementation.
2.2 Prototype Implementation
TrustZone is an architectural specification that can be implemented in many ways. Our
prototype is designed to study the practicality of verification with information flow. We
implemented key security features for multicore implementations of TrustZone, but did
not include non-essential functions.
Figure 1 shows a block diagram of our implementation of TrustZone. Our imple-
mentation includes two five-stage pipelined MIPS processing cores, private L1 caches,
a shared L2 cache, a DMA engine, a ring network, and a memory module. Each core
has private L1 instruction and data caches, which are connected to a shared L2 cache
through a ring network. The L2 cache includes a prefetch buffer. The system includes
a DMA engine that can move data between memory locations. The DMA engine takes
requests from processing cores through a memory-mapped interface connected to the
ring network. It also has an external debug interface. The L2 cache and theDMAengine
are connected to the main memory controller through an arbiter. Our processor was
implemented in 16,234 lines of Verilog code. This is comparable to other open-source
processors such as OpenRISC (31,944 lines) and RISC-V (14,206 lines).
The prototype implements the security features of TrustZone that are necessary
to isolate the secure world from the normal world. The processing cores, the DMA
engine, and the debug interface include an NS bit to indicate the security domain. The
NS bits for the DMA engine and the debug interface can be changed by a secure-world
core through a memory-mapped interface. All bus transactions, memory requests, and
memory response packets carry the NS bit of the core or DMA engine that initiated the
request.
The prototype supports world switches for cores through an instruction. World-
switching is implemented in a way that ensures that the NS bits of in-flight instructions
are not corrupted. The pipeline is stalled until all in-flight instructions have completed.
Then, the NS bit of the core is changed. Registers which are labeled with NS bits are
cleared (set to 0) when the NS bit changes. Clearing prevents the implicit downgrad-
ing [42] problem, which we do not have space to describe here. Register files and the
PC register are cleared. When the PC is 0 and the core is in normal world, the PC
jumps to an offset storing a switch-to-normal handler. Address 0 stores a secure world
handler. Arguments to calls between the two worlds must be passed via memory.
The caches allow data from both worlds to coexist. Each line of the L1 and L2
caches is extended with the NS bit to indicate the world that owns the data. On a hit, the
NS bit of the access is compared to the NS bit of the cache line. If there is a mismatch,
the access is treated as a miss.
The bus slaves use access control. For example, normal-world requests to the DMA
engine are rejected when the DMA engine is in the secure world. The main memory
includes an access control module. A partition control register in the module partitions
the address space between worlds. The partition control register is memory-mapped
and can only be modified by a secure-world request.
The prototype implements the security features of TrustZone necessary to protect
the confidentiality and integrity of the secure world in a multi-core SoC. Protection
includes support for hardware IP modules (e.g., a DMA engine) and a debug interface.
However, the security domains in TrustZone are orthogonal to traditional privilege levels
and virtual memory, so our processor does not include supervisor/user mode or virtual
address translation. Also, optional functions such as additional peripherals, coherent
accelerators, tightly coupled memory, and protected interrupts are not implemented.
3 Verification Methodology
3.1 Background: SecVerilog
Our security verification methodology relies on information flow control enforced at
the hardware description language (HDL) level. SecVerilog [42] extends Verilog with
a syntax for annotating variables (wires and regs) with security labels. Security labels
represent security levels such as H (high-security) or L (low-security). In addition
to the variable annotations, the programmer defines a lattice of security levels [7] to
specify how information may flow among security levels. For example, the lattice might
specify that variables labeled H cannot flow to variables labeled L, but that variables
labeled L can flow anywhere. More formally, security levels ` ∈ L form a lattice
with ordering relation v. If L v H , information is permitted to flow from variables
labeled L to variables labeled H . However, information flow is prevented from H to
L if H @ L. The levels ⊥ and > denote the least and greatest security levels ordered
by the relation v. The variable annotations and lattice form an information flow policy,
which is enforced by the type system. Checking is done statically at design time, and
variable annotations have no affect on the synthesized hardware.
In SecVerilog, security types τ have the syntax shown in Figure 2. Types may either
be labels (`), the meet (u) or join (unionsq) of two types, or a dependent type f (v), where f is
a type-level function, and v is a variable name. The meet and join represent the greatest
lower bound and least upper bound of their operands respectively. We later extend this
syntax in Section 4 to handle more practical hardware designs.
Types τ ::= ` | f (v) | τ1 unionsq τ2 | τ1 u τ2
Figure 2: SecVerilog syntax of security labels.
1 reg {L} v, {L} l, {H} h;
2 // LH(0) = L, LH(1) = H
3 wire {LH(v)} shared;
4 ...
5 if (v == 0) l = shared;
6 else h = shared;
7 ...
8 if (h == 0) l = 0;
9 else l = 1;
10 ...
Figure 3: SecVerilog code example.
SecVerilog enforces the security policy by constraining assignment statements. For
example, Figure 3 shows a code example for the policy that prevents flow from H to L.
In the example, explicit flows such as l=h are disallowed, because they directly violate
the security policy. SecVerilog prevents explicit flows with an assignment typing rule
that requires the expression on the right of the assignment to be less than the variable
on the left according to the ordering relation v. Implicit flows such as the insecure
assignments on lines 8–9 leak information indirectly through control flow. To prevent
implicit flows, the type system associates a security level, pc, with each node in the
control flow graph. Assignments are allowed only if the pc is lower than the level of
the assigned variable. The expression typing rules determine the least upper bound of
information contained in each expression. For example, the expression l & h has type
H since this is the lowest type that is at least as restrictive as the types of both l and h.
In the syntax, f (v) is a fully-applied function representing a dependent type. Depen-
dent types describe static types that depend on the run-time values of variables. They
are used to describe hardware which is shared by different security levels over time. In
Figure 3, shared has a type which depends on v. Here, LH is a function that is L when v
is 0 and H when v is 1. To perform checking at design time, SecVerilog statically gener-
ates predicates to reason about the run-time behavior of dependent types. For example,
to check the assignment on line 5, it generates the invariant v = 0 ⇒ LH (v) v L.
These invariants are based on a conservative approximation of strongest postcondition
reasoning as described by Zhang et al. [42], and are checked by an automated constraint
solver [6].
3.2 Approach
This paper studies the application of language-level information flow control to formally
verify secure isolation properties of hardware designs. While security architectures
in processors typically rely on access control mechanisms and are not designed for
information flow security, this study shows that the key security goals of such processors
can be naturally captured by information flow policies.
To use HDL-level IFC, hardware designers first represent the security goal of the
TrustZone Security Policy Information Flow Policy Label Downgrading
P1. Normalworld core/IP cannot (C) read
or (I) write secure-world memory/IP
CT for secure world core/IP/memory
PU for normal world core/IP/memory
(dependent type based on the NS bit)
D1-1. Secure world reads/writes to normal-world
memory/IP
D1-2. Timing dependence (common for all)
P2. (I) Normal world cannot change NS
bits
PT for NS bits D2-1. Secure world writes to an NS bit
D2.2. Legitimate normal-to-secure NS-bit switches
P3. (I) Normal world cannot change
TrustZone control registers
PT for TrustZone control registers D3-1. Secure-world writes to TrustZone control
registers
Table 1: Core TrustZone policy expressed as information flow constraints with explicit
exceptions (declassification/endorsement). (C) and (I) represent policy for confiden-
tiality and integrity, respectively. IP (Intellectual Property) is a hardware module.
hardware isolation mechanisms with a set of information flow constraints. The designer
then annotates the HDL code along with a security lattice to express the information
flow constraints as a concrete information flow policy. Because the goal is to remove
unintentional bugs, designers and the security policy that they write are trusted. The
design is then verified with type checking. If the hardware design passes type checking,
the type system formally guarantees that the code enforces noninterference [42, 11]
under the given policy.
The formulation of noninterference enforced by SecVerilog is timing-sensitive (i.e.,
it prevents timing channels), since timing-flows are indistinguishable from non-timing
flows at the gate level [37]. However, the threat model of TrustZone does not restrict
timing flows, perhaps because preventing timing channels imposes performance over-
heads. As we will see, a challenge is posed by this disparity between the language-level
policy and the security goals of the architecture.
3.3 TrustZone as an Information Flow Policy
This subsection uses TrustZone as an example to show how HDL-level IFC can verify
an isolated execution environment. TrustZone isolates the secure world from the normal
world using access control policies andmechanisms that control normal-world accesses.
As shown in the first column of Table 1, the goal of each access control policy is to
protect either the confidentiality (C) or the integrity (I) of security-sensitive state.
The high-level security goal of TrustZone can be expressed as information flow con-
straints that address either confidentiality or integrity requirements. The confidentiality
policies specify that no information can flow from secure-world processing cores, mem-
ory, or hardware (IP) blocks to normal-world modules. The integrity constraints ensure
that no information from a normal-world core/memory/IP can affect a secure-world
core/memory/IP or other trusted state such as NS bits and TrustZone control registers.
The above information flow constraints can be translated into an information flow
policy expressed with a security lattice and labels in HDL code. To express both
confidentiality and integrity levels, we define four security levels: CT, CU, PT, and
PU. The first letter represents the confidentiality level (confidential or public) and the
second letter represents the integrity level (trusted or untrusted). Then, we define
a security lattice that prevents confidential information from flowing to public and
con
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Figure 4: Security lattice for TrustZone.
untrusted information from affecting trusted as shown in Figure 4. In the figure, the
arrows represent the direction of allowed information flow.
The second column in Table 1 shows how the TrustZone implementation is labeled
using the security levels in the lattice. To protect both confidentiality and integrity of
secure-world state, variables in secure-world processing cores, memory, and hardware
IP blocks are labeled CT while normal-world ones are labeled PU. Signals that are stati-
cally allocated to one world are annotated with fixed labels. Most hardware resources
(e.g., the processing cores) can be switched between the two worlds. The security labels
of time-shared modules use a dependent type and are expressed as a function (world)
of the NS bit (ns) associated with that module. Here, world(ns)maps the value of ns
to a security label: 1 maps to PU and 0 maps to CT. Signals that must be trusted, but are
not confidential, are labeled PT. For example, NS bits and TrustZone control registers,
such as the one that partitions memory among worlds, must be trustworthy. The clock
and reset variables are also labeled PT.
Unfortunately, strict noninterference is too restrictive for practical systems likeTrust-
Zone because it does not allow any communication between security levels. TrustZone
prevents the normal world from acting maliciously, but trusts the secure world to release
information to or accept information from the normal world correctly. This permitted
communication violates noninterference and causes type errors.
To bridge the gap between noninterference and practical security policies, we in-
troduce declassification and endorsement expressions so that designers can explicitly
allow exceptions to noninterference. Declassification releases confidential information
to the public. Endorsement changes the security level of untrusted information so that
it is considered trusted. The term downgrading refers to both.
The third column in Table 1 shows how downgrading is used to express the security
policy of TrustZone. TrustZone allows the secure world to access the normal world (D1-
1). The TrustZone threat model does not include timing-channel attacks, so information
flows through timing (D1-2) are allowed. Secure-world writes to NS bits (D2-1) and
control registers (D3-1) are allowed even though their values may be read by the normal
world. TrustZone allows the normal world to trigger a world switch through a special
instruction (D2-2) even though this causes a flow from the normal world to the NS bit.
Section 6.1 discusses how downgrading is used in the prototype in more detail.
3.4 Security Assurance with Downgrading
Static information flow analysis with SecVerilog provides a formal security guarantee
that the described hardware enforces noninterference [42]. This guarantee is indepen-
dent of functional correctness. If there is no downgrading, type checking ensures that
the security policy specified by the labels is enforced even if there is a functional bug.
Therefore, our verification methodology ensures that the only possible violations to
the security policy are through downgrading. This improves security assurance in two
ways. First, all potentially dangerous information flows are made explicit and designers
must explicitly allow each of them in the source code. Second, the size of the code that
can cause vulnerabilities is significantly reduced; only code that affects downgrading
expressions can lead to vulnerabilities. Without information flow analysis, bugs in any
part of the code may break security.
We argue that our use of downgrading policies permits information to be down-
graded only under the authority of the secure world software and that downgrading
cannot be controlled by the normal world software. We substantiate this claim by an
analysis of the conditions under which downgrading expressions may be removed (see
Section 6.1). For example, the downgrading expressions for memory accesses can be
removed if there is no access from the secure world. Explicit communication between
security levels is only permitted if initiated by the secure world; data is downgraded
only if the NS bit of the request is secure. Our analysis shows that these downgrading
expressions can be removed if the secure world never executes. This suggests that only
the secure world may affect information release.
3.5 Security Labeling Errors
The security labels specify the security policy that is verified by type checking. As a
result, a security vulnerability may not be detected if the security labels are incorrect.
For example, if an entire processing core is labeled CT when it is in the normal world,
the information flow analysis will not detect a violation which permits that core to read
secure memory. However, we found that errors in security labels are typically detected
as long as labels are correct at sources and sinks. Labels must be consistent along all
possible paths of an information flow to pass the type check. Unintentional mistakes
are unlikely to be consistent with other labels.
4 Language Extensions
We introduce SecVerilogBL, which extends the SecVerilog hardware description lan-
guage with three significant features needed to verify practical systems. These exten-
sions include new type declarations that can specify distinct security labels for each
bit of a vector and for each element of an array and a syntax for declassification and
endorsement. We prove that SecVerilogBL enforces the same security guarantee as
SecVerilog [42], namely, that well-typed programs enforce observational determin-
ism [31].
1 wire [0:31] {world(ns)} data;
2 wire [32:41] {PT} addr;
3 wire {PT} ns;
4 wire [0:42] {i -> if (i <= 31) world(ns) PT} packet;
5 assign packet = {ns, addr, data};
Figure 5: A packet concatenation example.
4.1 Downgrading
As described earlier, the security policy of TrustZone is described using an integri-
ty/confidentiality diamond lattice. This lattice policy is more conservative than the
TrustZone policy, which assumes secure world software is written correctly and makes
no mistakes when reading from or writing to normal world data. To relax the lattice pol-
icy, we use downgrading, which lowers the type of the downgraded expression within
the security lattice.
Downgrading expressions are used only to allow the secure world to read and
write normal-world data and to avoid timing channel protection. Since downgrading
is used sparingly, SecVerilogBL includes a downgrading syntax, downgrade(e, τ)
adopted from Sabelfeld et al. [26]. This syntax is used for both declassification and
endorsement. Downgrading expressions take two arguments, an expression e and a type
τ. The downgrading expression then behaves semantically like e, except that during
type checking, its type is treated as if it were τ.
This syntax allows the designer to precisely control where information is released.
The type of a downgraded expression is modified only in the context in which it is
downgraded. For example, if x has type CT and y has type PU, the assignment y =
x would be rejected even if z = downgrade(x, PU) appears elsewhere in the same
HDL code. The downgrading syntax also permits precise control over what information
is released. For example, the expression downgrade(x > 3, PU) reveals whether or
not x is greater than 3, but it does not reveal the value of x.
4.2 Per-Bit Types
Hardware designs often use sequences of bits to describe data structures. For example,
a packet in our TrustZone implementation is a collection of bits describing data, an
address, and possibly other metadata. SecVerilog reasons imprecisely about individual
fields of a packet, since the whole packet must share a single label. Information about
the labels of individual wires is lost once they are grouped.
Figure 5 shows an example that creates a packet by concatenating data with an
address and the NS bit. For now, ignore the security label on line 4, which uses a new
syntax explained later in this section. Grouping variables in this waymakes code clearer
andmore compact. Unfortunately, SecVerilog cannot precisely capture the desired label
for the resulting packet. In this example, the address is public, but depending on the
value of the ns bit, the data could be confidential. Thus, the (static) security levels of
some of the bits in the packet depend on the run-time value of other bits.
A dependent type is a natural way to describe a situation like this one, in which
a static type depends on run-time values. But the prior dependently-typed HDL,
Kinds k ::= ` | int⇀ k
Types τ ::= ` | τ1 unionsq τ2 | τ1 u τ2 | x 7→ τ | f x
| if eτ τt τf | case eτ τ1 . . . τn
Figure 6: Syntax of SecVerilogBL labels.
SecVerilog, does not have enough expressive power to describe the example just given.
The upper 11 bits of the packet have a different label than the rest of the packet, but
SecVerilog applies the same label to all bits in a bit vector. Lowering the type of the
entire packet is not a solution. The non-data bits are used for routing decisions which
affect both worlds, so this type change would cause SecVerilog to variable an insecure
flow.
Our solution is to enrich what can be expressed using dependent labels, as shown
in braces on line 4. The label expression specifies that the security class of the ith bit
depends both on i and on the value of the ns bit. The type of packet is a function
that takes an integer, i, representing an index to the bit vector. If the index is less than
31, the data is accessed, so it returns a type that depends on the MSB of the packet
that corresponds to the ns bit. Otherwise, the address or the ns bit is accessed, so the
returned type is PT.
Figure 6 shows the formal type syntax of SecVerilogBL. Crucially, the type system
is extended with types of higher kinds. Kinds, written k, can either be levels ` ∈ L
or partial functions from integers to other kinds. In the SecVerilog syntax, all types,
including dependent types (which are functions that are fully applied to variables) are
of the kind `.
Types (i.e., labels) in the extended syntax, written τ, are pure (side-effect-free)
expressions signifying security levels. The syntax v 7→ τ specifies a mapping from a
position in the bit vector to the type of the bit at that position, and is used to specify the
type of packet in Figure 5. Since v 7→ τ is a form of function abstraction, types written
with this syntax are higher-kinded. Dependent types may be written by referring to
program variables in the type expression. The syntax if eτ τt τf and case eτ τ1 ...τn
describe conditional selection between security labels. The syntax of eτ describes pure
expressions and is omitted because it is standard. However, notably eτ may contain
variables declared in the program, and therefore, can be used to write dependent types.
At a high level, the type system is extended to track the bit-width of each variable
in addition to its type. Types of kind ` are lifted in the obvious way to int⇀ `, so that
all types become functions from bit indices to labels. During assignment checking, the
bit-width of both sides of the assignment is used as a range for quantification.
The type rules of SecVerilogBL are shown in Figure 7. In addition to a standard
type environment Γ, a width environmentW maps variables to their bit-widths. The
width environment is populated with the declared widths of variables. Bit-widths are
static, finite, and specified with integer constants. Since Verilog does not support
dynamically-sized bit vectors, ranges are easily determined at compile time. Typing
judgments for expressions have the formΘ; Γ;W ` e : τ,w meaning that under context
Θ; Γ;W , expression e has type τ and bit-width w. A kind environment, Θ, is used to
make kind judgments of the form Θ ` τ : k.
The rule T-Logical for logical binary operators checks that the widths of both
expressions are the same and that both expressions have int ⇀ ` types. The type
of the resulting expression is the bitwise join of the types of the operands. The rule
T-Arithmust track the bits that are propagated by carry bits. The ith bit of the result is
affected by all bits below i from both inputs. The rule for concatenations (T-Concat)
selects between the type functions of the original subexpressions, shifting the upper
expression as needed. The rules for shifting by constants (T-LShift and T-RShift)
select the bottom type for the bits of the resulting expression that are constant. For the
remaining parts, the type function of the non-constant subexpression is shifted. The
rule for indexed arrays (T-ArrIndex) is discussed in Section 4.3.
Per-bit checking is done in the type-checking rule for assignments. The check veri-
fies that the type of each bit of the right side of the assignment (joined with the program
counter) is lower than the corresponding bit on the left. To type-check an assignment of
some expression with type τr to a variable x, with type τl , both of these types are applied
to each integer within (0,W (x)). If the condition ∀i ∈ (0,W (x)).τr (i)unionsq pc(i) v τl (i)
holds, the check succeeds. We omit the rules for commands since they are straightfor-
ward. Notably, pc is a bitwise label that is determined by commands in a straightforward
way. Using a bitwise label for pc is more permissive than alternative rules which might
compute the join over the bitwise labels of expressions, for example, used as conditionals
in if-statements.
4.3 Per-Element Types
Arrays are commonly used in hardware descriptions and are important for our TrustZone
implementation. However, SecVerilog has minimal support for labeling arrays; all
elements must have the same type. The code segment shown in Figure 8 describes
part of the memory array of a cache that implements reads. The input ns is the NS-bit
of the device originating the read request. The output read is the output data, which
has a type that depends on read_ns. This code is secure, but cannot be written in
SecVerilog.
Following common practice, the cache is implemented as an array of memory cells,
mem. Another array reg_ns stores the NS bit of the last device to write to each address
of the array. Therefore, the label of a particular memory cell at array position i should
depend on reg_ns. With support for fine-grained array labels, the memory cells can
be implemented conveniently as an array of bit vectors.
To support arrays in which each element has a distinct type, array variables must
have kind int ⇀ int ⇀ ` when they are declared. In the rule for indexed arrays
(T-Arr-Index), the type of the array, τx , is applied as a function to the expression that
indexes the array, e. Doing so produces the security label of the selected element of the
array. The requirement imposed on the kind of τx ensures that τx e is int⇀ `, which
is a mapping from the bit position to the label of that bit. Arrays in Verilog may only be
indexed by variables and constants rather than arbitrary expressions, and therefore e can
be substituted into τx at compile time. If e is a variable, this forms a dependent type.
Constraints for these dependent types are generated using a conservative approximation
of strongest postcondition analysis as in [42]. The label τ′e is the (bitwise) join over
T-Const
Γ;W;Θ ` n : ⊥,w T-Var
Γ(x) = τ W (x) = w
Γ;W;Θ ` x : τ,w
T-Logical
Γ;W;Θ ` e1 : τ1,w Γ;W;Θ ` e2 : τ2,w
Θ ` τ1 : int⇀ ` Θ ` τ2 : int⇀ `
τ = i 7→ (τ1 i) unionsq (τ2 i)
Γ;W;Θ ` e1 bop e2 : τ,w
(when bop ∈ {∨ ∧ ⊕})
T-Arith
Γ;W;Θ ` e1 : τ1,w Γ;W;Θ ` e2 : τ2,w
Θ ` τ1 : int⇀ ` Θ ` τ2 : int⇀ `
τ = i 7→
⊔
j∈(1,i)
((τ1 j) unionsq (τ2 j))
Γ;W;Θ ` e1 bop e2 : τ,w
(when bop ∈ {+−})
T-Concat
Γ;W;Θ ` e1 : τ1,w1 Γ;W;Θ ` e2 : τ2,w2
Θ ` τ1 : int⇀ ` Θ ` τ2 : int⇀ `
τ = i 7→ if(i > w2) (τ1 i − w2 + 1) (τ2 i)
Γ;W;Θ ` {e1; e2} : τ, (w1 + w2)
T-LShift
Γ;W;Θ ` e : τ,w Θ ` τ : int⇀ `
τ′ = i 7→ if (i > n) (τ i − n + 1) ⊥
Γ;W;Θ ` e << n : τ′,w T-RShift
Γ;W;Θ ` e : τ,w Θ ` τ : int⇀ `
τ = i 7→ if (i > w − n) ⊥ (τ i + n)
Γ;W;Θ ` e >> n : τ,w
T-ArrIndex
Γ(x) = τx W (x) = w
Γ;W;Θ ` e : τe,we
Θ ` τx : int⇀ int⇀ `
Θ ` τe : int⇀ `
τ′e = i 7→
⊔
i∈(1,we )
τe i
Γ;W;Θ ` x[e] : τ′e unionsq (τx e),w
Figure 7: Typing rules for SecVerilogBL expressions.
1 ...
2 reg [0:31] {world(ns)} read;
3 reg [0:31] { i -> j -> world(reg_ns[i]) } mem[0:1023];
4 reg {PT} reg_ns [0:1023];
5 ...
6 if(ns == 1) begin
7 read = (reg_ns[read_addr] == 1) ?
8 mem[read_addr] : 32’b0;
9 end else begin
10 ...
Figure 8: A register file code segment.
the int⇀ ` label of e. Since the value of e determines which element of x is selected,
each bit of e affects the value of x[e]. So τ′e is used to elevate the label of x[e] to
reflect that each bit of e has influenced x[e]
On line 3 of Figure 8, mem has an array type that maps the index of the array
to a type that depends on the value stored in reg_ns at the corresponding index.
Although the function does not depend on j, it is still written as a type function of
kind int ⇀ int ⇀ `, so that when the array index is applied, the type can serve as a
mapping from bits to types. To support arrays of bit vectors where each element has a
different mapping from indices to types, the type function can be written to depend on
both i and j.
Per-bit and per-element type declarations enable better component designs that
are not otherwise possible and reduce programmer effort. For example, without per-
element types there is no way to describe a queue that is dynamically shared among
security domains. With per-element types, a securely shared queue can be described
with an array of queue data entries and a queue of security tags that correspond to the
data. A prior implementation without shared queues required separate queues for each
security domain and for each port. The improved design with shared queues has six
fewer queues, three fewer arbiters, and four fewer demultiplexers than the other design.
The improved design required 392 fewer lines of code. Per-bit types also made the
description of network packets clearer and more compact.
4.4 Soundness
Any well-typed SecVerilogBL program without downgrading obeys observational de-
terminism [42, 31], a generalization of noninterference [11] for nondeterministic sys-
tems. The formulation of observational determinism enforced is the timing-sensitive
one presented by Zheng et al. [42]. Informally, it states that if the hardware begins
execution from two states which are indistinguishable to an attacker, then on each clock
cycle and beginning from either initial state, the hardware will produce states which are
also indistinguishable to the attacker.
In the rest of this section, we provide a formal definition and proof of this theorem.
The proof is accomplished by a translation from well-typed SecVerilogBL programs
into well-typed SecVerilog programs. SecVerilogBL bit vectors are simulated with 1-
bit SecVerilog variables and a corresponding translation of SecVerilogBL environments
into SecVerilog environments. SecVerilogBL expressions of width w translate into a
vector of w SecVerilog expressions. Assignments of w-bit expressions are unrolled
into w assignments. The translation of commands other than assignment statements
merely propagate the translation of assignments. The translation is clearly semantics-
preserving, and the security result is obtained by showing that the translation is also
type-preserving.
The translation splits non-array variables, x, into single-bit representations x1,...,xn,
where xi stores the ith bit of the original variable x. The notation JΓ;W;ΘK denotes the
translation of SecVerilogBL environment Γ;W;Θ into a SecVerilog environment Γ′
containing 1-bit variables. Each variable x j ∈ Γ is translated intoW (x j ) 1-bit variables
whenever Γ(x j ) has kind int⇀ `. Otherwise, Γ(x j ) has kind int⇀int⇀`, and x j
represents an array, translated into n ×W (x j ) 1-bit variables where n is the declared
length of the array:
JΓ;W;ΘK = J..., x j : τj, ...; ..., x j : w j, ..., ; τj : k j, ...K , {..., X j, ...}
where X j =
x j,1 : τj,1, ..., x j,wj : τj,wj if k j = int⇀ `x j,1,1 : τj,1,wj, ..., x j,n,wj : τj,n,wj if k j = int⇀ int⇀ `
The translation of expressions and assignment statements is shown in Figure 9. The
translation for other commands than statements merely propagates the translation of
statements. The translation for both statements and expressions also include Γ,W , and
Θ as arguments. For notational convenience, defineWJeKΓ;W;Θ = w ⇐⇒ Γ;W;Θ `
e : τ,w for some τ. Each translation of a SecVerilogBL expression produces a vector
of SecVerilog expressions. The meta-syntax EJeKΓ;W;Θ(i) selects the ith element of
the vector produced by EJeKΓ;W;Θ. The notation ~e|i∈(n1,n2) constructs a new vector by
replacing the free occurrences of i in e with each integer in the range (n1, n2).
Note that in the rules for logical and arithmetic operatorsWJe1KΓ;W;Θ =WJe2KΓ;W;Θ.
In the rule for the translation of addition and subtraction, Cn−1, is a straightforward bit-
level representation of the carry-out from the summation of the digits at n − 1. The
translation for arrays produces a nested conditional assignment that dynamically checks
the value of the indexing expression (e) to select from among n w-size vectors where
n is the declared size of the array and w is the width of each array element. The
translation for assignment unrolls the assignment into separate assignments for each of
the 1-bit variables. Although not shown, integer constants translate into their binary
representations.
Figure 10 shows the type-directed translation from SecVerilogBL typing derivations
to SecVerilog types. The translation is only defined for types of well-typed expressions.
The rules have the form
P1 ... Pn
T JΓ;W;Θ ` e : τSecVerilogBL,wK
↪→−−−−−−−−−→τSecVerilog
where Pi is a premise in a type rule of SecVerilogBL, and
T JΓ;W;Θ ` e : τSecVerilogBL,wK ↪→ −−−−−−−−−→τSecVerilog
denotes that the typing derivation surrounded in brackets translates into the vector
of SecVerilog types −−−−−−−−−→τSecVerilog, and the meta-syntax −−−−−−−−−→τSecVerilog (i) denotes the ith
element in the vector of types. The notation T JτSecVerliogBLK is used for recursive
translation of types and it denotes −−−−−−−−−→τSecVerilog such that
T JΓ;W;Θ ` e : τSecVerilogBL,wK ↪→ −−−−−−−−−→τSecVerilog
where Γ,W , Θ, and e are all always clear from context. The target-language type may
contain types mentioned in the inferrence rules of the derivation.
Note that SecVerilog types are a strict subset of SecVerilogBL types, and that
SecVerilogBL types which are not SecVerilog types are abstractions, if-types, and
EJxKΓ;W;Θ , −−−−−−−−−−−→x1, ..., xW (x)
EJe1 bop e2KΓ;W;Θ , −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→EJe1KΓ;W;Θ(i) bop EJe2KΓ;W;Θ(i)i∈(1,WJe1KΓ;W;Θ)
EJe1 + e2KΓ;W;Θ , −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→EJe1KΓ;W;Θ(i) ⊕ EJe2KΓ;W;Θ(i) ⊕ Ci−1i∈(1,WJe1KΓ;W;Θ)
EJe1 − e2KΓ;W;Θ , −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→EJe1KΓ;W;Θ(i) ⊕ ¬EJe2KΓ;W;Θ(i) ⊕ Ci−1i∈(1,WJe1KΓ;W;Θ)
EJ{e1, e2}KΓ;W;Θ , −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→EJe1KΓ;W;Θ(i − w2 + 1)i∈(w2,w1+w2) :: −−−−−−−−−−−−→EJe2KΓ;W;Θ(i)i∈(1,w2)
(where w1,w2 =WJe1KΓ;W;Θ,WJe2KΓ;W;Θ)
EJe « nKΓ;W;Θ , −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→EJeKΓ;W;Θ(i − n)i∈(1,WJeKΓ;W;Θ−n) :: 0...0︸︷︷︸n times
EJe » nKΓ;W;Θ , 0...0︸︷︷︸
n times
::
−−−−−−−−−−→EJeKΓ;W;Θ ii∈(n,WJeKΓ;W;Θ)
EJx[e]KΓ;W;Θ , EJeKΓ;W;Θ == EJ0KΓ;W;Θ ? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→x0,1, ..., x0,WJx[e]KΓ;W;Θ :
EJeKΓ;W;Θ == EJ1KΓ;W;Θ ? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→x1,1, ..., x1,WJx[e]KΓ;W;Θ :
...
EJeKΓ;W;Θ == EJn − 1KΓ;W;Θ ? −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→xn−1,1, ..., xn−1,WJx[e]KΓ;W;Θ :
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→xn,1, ..., xn,WJx[e]KΓ;W;Θ
(where n = 2WJx[e]KΓ;W;Θ − 1)
EJx = eKΓ;W;Θ ,
begin
EJxKΓ;W;Θ(1) = EJeKΓ;W;Θ(1);
...;
EJxKΓ;W;Θ(WJxKΓ;W;Θ) = EJeKΓ;W;Θ(WJxKΓ;W;Θ);
end
Figure 9: Translation from SecVerilogBL expressions to SecVerilog expressions.
TTrans-Const T JΓ;W;Θ ` n : ⊥,wK ↪→ ⊥ TTrans-Var
Γ(x) = τ W (x) = w
T JΓ;W;Θ ` x : τ,wK ↪→ −−−−−−→T JτK(i)i∈(1,w)
TTrans-Logical
Γ;W;Θ ` e1 : τ1,w Γ;W;Θ ` e2 : τ2,w
Θ ` τ1 : int⇀ ` Θ ` τ2 : int⇀ `
τ = i 7→ (τ1 i) unionsq (τ2 i)
T JΓ;W;Θ ` e1 bop e2 : τ,wK
↪→−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→T Jτ1K(i) unionsq T Jτ2K(i)i∈(1,w)
(when bop ∈ {∨ ∧ ⊕})
TTrans-Arith
Γ;W;Θ ` e1 : τ1,w Γ;W;Θ ` e2 : τ2,w
Θ ` τ1 : int⇀ ` Θ ` τ2 : int⇀ `
τ = i 7→
⊔
j∈(1,i)
((τ1 j) unionsq (τ2 j))
T JΓ;W;Θ ` e1 bop e2 : τ,wK
↪→−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→⊔
j∈(1,i)
(T Jτ1K( j) unionsq T Jτ2K( j))i∈(1,w)
(when bop ∈ {+−})
TTrans-Concat
Γ;W;Θ ` e1 : τ1,w1 Γ;W;Θ ` e2 : τ2,w2
Θ ` τ1 : int⇀ ` Θ ` τ2 : int⇀ `
τ = i 7→ if(i > w2) (τ1 i − w2 + 1) (τ2 i)
T JΓ;W;Θ ` {e1; e2} : τ, (w1 + w2)K
↪→−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→T Jτ1K(i − w2 + 1)i∈(w1,w1+w2) :: −−−−−−−→T Jτ2K(i)i∈(1,w2)
TTrans-LShift
Γ;W;Θ ` e : τ,w Θ ` τ : int⇀ `
τ′ = i 7→ if (i > n) (τ i − n + 1) ⊥
T JΓ;W;Θ ` e << n : τ′,wK
↪→−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→T JτK(i − n + 1)i∈(1,w−n) :: ⊥...⊥︸︷︷︸
n times
TTrans-RShift
Γ;W;Θ ` e : τ,w Θ ` τ : int⇀ `
τ = i 7→ if (i > w − n) ⊥ (τ i + n)
T JΓ;W;Θ ` e >> n : τ,wK
↪→
⊥...⊥︸︷︷︸
n times
::
−−−−−−−−−−→T JτK(i + n)i∈(n,w)
TTrans-ArrIndex
Γ(x) = τx W (x) = w
Γ;W;Θ ` e : τe,we
Θ ` τx : int⇀ int⇀ `
Θ ` τe : int⇀ `
τ′e = i 7→
⊔
j∈( j,we )
τe j
T JΓ;W;Θ ` x[e] : τ′e unionsq (τx e),wK
↪→( ⊔
i∈(1,we )
T JτeK(i)) unionsq T Jτx eK
Figure 10: Type-directed translation from SecVerilogBL types to SecVerilog types.
case-types. The if-types and case-types are straightforwardly translated into functions
fully-applied to program variables (which are SecVerilog types) so these translations
are not shown. Also note that in the translation rules shown in Figure 10, all resulting
types have kind ` and are therefore SecVerilog types.
It is straightforward to check that the SecVerilog program after transformation
is semantically equivalent. The soundness result is obtained by showing that the
translation is also type-preserving. That is, well-typed SecVerilogBL programs that
do not contain downgrading translate into well-typed SecVerilog programs. Since
well-typed SecVerilog programs enforce observational determinism, SecVerilogBL
programs share the same result. We now show a proof of the type-preservation result
for commands.
In addition to thewell-formedness requirements of type environments in SecVerilog,
SecVerilogBL environments also require the following for a SecVerilogBL environment
to be well-formed:
Definition 1 (Well-Formedness of Environments) An environment Γ;W;Θ is well-
formed, written ` Γ;W;Θ, if for all x ∈ Γ such that Γ(x) = τ, W (x) = w, and
Θ ` τ : int ⇀ `, we have (τ i) is in the image of τ for all i ∈ (1,w). Otherwise,
Θ ` τ : int⇀ int⇀ ` and there is some n such that (τ j) is in the image of τ for all
j ∈ (1, n) and (τ j i) is in the image of (τ j) for all i ∈ (1,w).
Lemma 1 If e is a SecVerilogBL expression, then for all Γ,W,Θ such that ` Γ;W;Θ,
Γ;W;Θ ` e : τ,w ,and Θ ` τ : int ⇀ `, let (τ i) is defined denote that (τ i) is in the
image of τ, then (τ i) is defined and of kind ` for all i ∈ (1,w).
Proof. By induction over the type rules of SecVerilogBL
• T-Const: trivial.
• T-Var: by the definition of ` Γ;W;Θ
• T-Logical: By typing ruleWJeKΓ;W;Θ = WJe1KΓ;W;Θ = WJe2KΓ;W;Θ = w
Θ ` τi ` int⇀ ` for i ∈ {1, 2}. By the induction hypothesis (τi j) is defined for
all j ∈ (1,w) and i ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore, (τ j) is defined for all j ∈ (1,w). By
typing rule τ is of kind int⇀ ` and so its application to i is of kind `.
• T-Arith: similar to T-Logical.
• T-Concat:WJeKΓ;W;Θ = w1 +w2. We show that (τ i) is defined for i ∈ (1,w2)
and for i ∈ (w2,w1 + w2). (τ i) = (τ2 i) for i ∈ (1,w2) and by the induction
hypothesis (τ2 i) is defined and so is (τ i). (τ i) = (τ1 i − w2 + 1) for i ∈
(w2,w1 +w2), and since i −w2 + 1 ∈ (1,w1) for i ∈ (w2,w1 +w2), (τ1 i −w2 + 1)
is defined and so is (τ i). By typing rule τ is of kind int ⇀ ` and so its
application to i is of kind `.
• T-LShift: WJe«nKΓ;W;Θ = w. For the case in which n < w we show that
(τ′ i) is defined for i ∈ (1, n) and for i ∈ (n,w − n). (τ′ i) = (τ i − n + 1) for
i ∈ (n,w + n) and since i − n+ 1 ∈ (1,w) (τ i − n+ 1) is defined by the induction
hypothesis. Otherwise (τ′ i) =⊥. If n >= w, then (τ′ i) =⊥. By typing rule τ′ is
of kind int⇀ ` and so its application to i is of kind `.
• T-RShift: Similar to T-LShift.
• T-ArrIndex: By the definition of ` Γ;W;Θ, there is some n such that (τx j i)
is defined for all j ∈ (1, n) and for all i ∈ (1,w). Though not shown in the typing
rule for conciseness, we require that n is greater than the maximum number
expressible in we bits, so τx is defined over the range from 1 to all possible
valuations of e and τx e is defined over (1,w) By the induction hypothesis τe
is defined over (1,we), and so τ′e is defined and of kind int ⇀ `. Since τx is
applied to e it also of kind int ⇀ `, the application of τ′e unionsq (τx e) to an i is of
kind `.

Lemma 2 (Type Preservation of Expressions) If e is a SecVerilogBL expression, then
for all Γ,W,Θ such that ` Γ;W;Θ, Γ;W;Θ ` e : τ,w, Θ ` τ : int ⇀ `, and there
exists a derivation of T JΓ;W;Θ ` e : τ,wK ↪→ −−→τSV , let EJeKΓ;W;Θ = e1, ..., en and−−→τSV = τSV,1, ...τSV,m, then JΓ;W;ΘK ` e1 : τSV,1, ..., JΓ;W;ΘK ` ew : τSV,w
Proof. By induction over the translation rules of expressions using the type translation
rules of SecVerilogBL, the type rules of SecVerilog [41], Lemma 1, the definition of
well-formedness, and the definition of JΓ;W;ΘK. As before, let (τ i) is defined denote
that (τ i) is in the image of τ.
• v: by the definition of JΓ;W;ΘK, TTrans-Var, and Lemma 1.
• e1 bop e2: By T-Logical (and T-Arith)WJe1KΓ;W;Θ = WJe2KΓ;W;Θ = w,
and by Lemma 1, (τ1 i) and (τ2 i) are both defined and of kind ` for i ∈
(1,w). Since e is well-typed, by TTrans-Logical or TTrans-Arith, the typing
derivation of e translates into
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(T Jτ1K(i)) unionsq (T Jτ2K(i))i∈(1,w) if bop is logical or−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→⊔
j∈(1,i) (T Jτ1K( j) unionsq T Jτ2K( j))i∈(1,w) if bop is arithmetic.In either case Lemma
2 holds of e1 and e2 by the induction hypothesis. The typing rule of binary
operators in SecVerilog requires that the type of e is the join of the types of e1
and e2. For both arithmetic and logical operators the translation is the join of the
type of e1 at index i with the type of e2 at index i, and so Lemma 2 holds of e.
• {e1, e2}: By Lemma 1, (τ1 i − w2 + 1) is defined and of kind ` for i ∈ (w2,w1 +
w2) and (τ2 i) is defined and of kind ` for i ∈ (1,w2). The formal language
SecVerilog does not support concatenations. However, the typing derivation of
e translates into
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→T Jτ1K(i − w2 + 1)i∈(w1,w1+w2) :: −−−−−−−→T Jτ2K(i)i∈(1,w2) which is the
concatentation of the types of e1 and e2 shifted appropriately. By the induction
hypothesis Lemma 2 holds of e1, and so the bits of e in range (w1,w1 + w2) are
well-typed. Similarly, Lemma 2 holds of e2 and so the remaining bits are also
well-typed. Since by the definition of EJ{e1, e2}KΓ;W;Θ, the bits of e1 and e2 are
concatenated in the same way as their types, each bit of EJeKΓ;W;Θ is well-typed
in SecVerilog by the corresponding bit of T JτK (by the SecVerilog typing rule
of variables and the definition of JΓ;W;ΘK).
• e′«n, e′»n: The formal language SecVerilog does not support shifts. This case
is similar to {e1, e2}, noting that the bits of e which are not bits of e′ are always
zero, and by the SecVerilog typing rule for constants are well-typed with type ⊥.
• x[e]: By T-ArrIndexWJeKΓ;W;Θ = we, and the maximum valuation of e is n
as defined in the translation rule. By the definitions of ` Γ;W;Θ and JΓ;W;ΘK
and Lemma 1 (τx j i) is defined and of kind ` for j ∈ (1, n) and i ∈ (1,w),
so P(xi, j ) holds for j ∈ (1, n) and i ∈ (1,w). The definition of EJx[e]KΓ;W;Θ
evaluates to some SecVerilog variable xi, j so by the definition of JΓ;W;ΘK and
the typing rule of SecVerilog variables, Lemma 2 holds of x[e].

Lemma 3 (Type Preservation) If c is a SecVerilogBL command, Γ is a type context,
andW is a width environment such that Γ;W;Θ ` c, then JΓ;W;ΘK ` c.
Proof. By induction on the translation of commands. The only interesting case is
assignment. Because the translation for expressions is type-preserving when those
expressions have int⇀ ` types (Lemma 2), and all expressions appearing in commands
have such types (by assignment rule), and the SecVerilogBL type rule applies the
type function for both sides of the assignment to each integer less than the width of
the assigned expression, w, then the translation will result in w separate SecVerilog
assignments, which will all type-check. 
Theorem 1 (Observational Determinism) If c is a SecVerilogBL command, Γ is a
type context, and W is a width environment such that Γ;W;Θ `: c, then c obeys
observational determinism.
Proof. This theorem follows directly from Lemma 3 and the proof of observational
determinism for SecVerilog [42]. 
5 Architecture Extensions
5.1 Return Response Access Controls
In the baseline TrustZone prototype, memory transactions are controlled with access
controls on requests but not on responses. This design is secure if the processor’s
memory hierarchy is functionally correct; normal-world cores should never receive a
response containing secure-world data because the corresponding request would have
been denied. Unfortunately, such functional correctness is difficult to prove statically,
especially for the complex memory hierarchies of modern processors.
To address this challenge, the prototype is extended with run-time access controls
that ensure theNS bit of eachmemory responsematches theNS bit of the receiving core.
The added access controls enforce the invariant that secure-world responses cannot be
read by normal-world cores, and enable the type system to statically prove the security
of the processor. Note that typechecking fails if the response check is functionally
incorrect and does not enforce the invariant.
5.2 Potential ISA Extensions
In TrustZone, secure-world programs are trusted and allowed to access both secure and
normalmemory. The secure world software’s intention to access either secure or normal
memory is communicated implicitly through the phyiscal memory address. Existing
TrustZone implementations assume that secure-world software intends to downgrade
the accessed data if the memory address points to the normal-world memory. As a
result, a bug in the memory address calculation may cause information flow to/from
normal-world memory even when secure-world software did not intend to downgrade
information.
Such incorrect downgrading can be avoided by extending the ISA with loads and
stores that explicitly indicate whether the software intends to access normal world mem-
ory or secure world memory. Indicating the intended world requires a single bit. This
extension allows downgrading to be performed based on explicit information provided
by the software rather than relying on information implicit in the possibly erroneous
memory address. These new instructions would remove a functional correctness as-
sumption about the hardware.
6 Evaluation
6.1 Verification with No Bugs
Here, we discuss the results of the information flow analysis for our TrustZone imple-
mentation when no security vulnerabilities are introduced. Later, we introduce bugs
into the processor to evaluate the effectiveness of information flow at detecting vul-
nerabilities. The implementation of TrustZone passes type checking when analyzed
by SecVerilogBL. Typechecking formally guarantees that, aside from variables which
affect downgraded expressions, there is no violation of the information flow policy
expressed in the code. Downgraded expressions explicitly permit exceptions to the
policy
Table 2 summarizes the uses of downgrading in each microarchitecture compo-
nent of our implementation of TrustZone. The table categorizes these downgrading
expressions as confidentiality exceptions (C → P), integrity exceptions (U → T), or
both. The downgrade expressions are further classified by the type of variable – data
(Data), address or control (AddrCtrl), NS-bit (NS), or control register (CReg) – at the
source and destination using the notation source→destination. Address or control
variables include valid/ready variables in the network, and instruction decode outputs
and stall variables in the cores. The numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of
downgrade expressions of that form.
SecverilogBL enforces a timing-sensitive security property; however, the threat
model of the architecture under study does not address timing channels. Timing
channels will cause type errors even though they are not considered threats. Therefore,
timing channels must be distinguished from other kinds of illegal information flows.
Categorizing flows based on variable type is useful for doing so; timing channels in
hardware typically originate from an address or control variable, but are not directly
derived from data.
Component Name C → P U → T
Core Pipeline AddrCtrl → NSB (1)
AddrCtrl → AddrCtrl (1)
L2 Cache
Data → CReg (1)
AddrCtrl → AddrCtrl (2)
AddrCtrl → NSB (12)
Network AddrCtrl → AddrCtrl (4)
AddrCtrl → NSB (1)
DMA Engine AddrCtrl → NSB (1)
Debug Interface AddrCtrl → NSB (1)
Memory Arbiter AddrCtrl → AddrCtrl (2)
Memory Access
Control Module
Data → CReg (1)
AddrCtrl → NSB (4)
Main Memory Data → Data (1) Data → Data (1)
AddrCtrl → AddrCtrl (2)
Table 2: Downgrading expressions in our prototype.
The following paragraphs summarize why downgrading was needed based on the
variable type categorization.
Data→Data TrustZone allows the secure world (CT) to read or write normal-world
(PU) memory, contrary to the lattice policy. When secure world writes to normal-world
memory, confidentiality is violated. Similarly, secure-world reads from normal-world
could violate integrity. The data must be downgraded to permit the intended behavior.
This use of downgrading is safe because the secure world is trusted.
Data → CReg Control registers are labeled PT, because they are used to control
both secure-world and normal-world operations. However, control registers can also
be modified by the secure-world. This is a violation of the confidentiality policy (since
it is a flow from CT to PT), and must be explicitly permitted with downgrading. Note
that normal world is still prevented from setting control registers since downgrading is
performed only for a write from the secure world.
AddrCtrl → Data, AddrCtrl → AddrCtrl Illegal flows from address/control
variables to address, control, and data variables are caused by timing interference
between security levels. Timing interference leaks information from address/control
variables (AddrCtrl) but not data variables (Data).
AddrCtrl → NSB Resources which are used by both worlds cause flows from
control variables to the NS bit. Figure 11 shows a representative example of this type of
flow. It shows a bus arbiter that accepts requests from both cores that could be executing
in either world. The output NS bit becomes the NS bit of the core that is granted access.
Here, the NS bit is labeled PT because its integrity needs to be protected from the
normal world, leading to information flow from CT/PU to PT. In the core, the NS bit
is changed by an instruction with label world(ns), similarly requiring downgrading.
Here, downgrading affects the timing of the NS bit change, but does not introduce a
vulnerability.
The information flow analysis in SecVerilogBL formally proves timing-sensitive
noninterference. However, explicit uses of downgrading expressions are used to weaken
1 input {world(ns1)} cpu1_valid;
2 input {world(ns2)} cpu2_valid;
3 input {PT} ns1;
4 input {PT} ns2;
5 output {PT} ns_out;
6 ...
7 if (cpu1_valid == 1) ns_out <= ns1;
8 else if (cpu2_valid == 1) ns_out <= ns2;
9 ...
Figure 11: A flow from control to NS due to resource arbitration.
1 input {PT} ns;
2 input [dw-1:0] {world(ns)} data_in;
3
4 reg [dw-1:0] {PT} part_reg;
5 ...
6 // Detected bug.
7 part_reg <= data_in;
8 ...
9 // Correct code.
10 if (ns == 0) part_reg <= downgrade(data_in, PT);
11 ...
Figure 12: A detected access control omission.
noninterference. We argue that in our implementation, downgrading is used only under
the authority of the secure world, and therefore that information release cannot be
controlled by the normal world. To show that this is true, we note that information is
never downgraded if the secure world never performs an operation. In other words,
downgrading can be removed if the secure world is hard-coded to not execute. Both
Data → Data (secure-world reads/writes to memory) and Data → Creg (secure-
world writes to control registers) flows happen under an if condition that checks if an
access is from the secure world. These downgraded information flows never happen
if there is no secure-world access. The flows from AddrCtrl variables cause timing
contention. Downgrading is unnecessary if there is no secure-world access because
ns_out will always be 1 (normal world). Since information is never downgraded when
the secure world is inactive, this suggests that information release cannot be controlled
by the normal world.
6.2 Security Bug Detection
Here, we study the effectiveness of the proposed information flow analysis at detecting
security bugs. We developed a set of security bugs based on reported vulnerabilities in
commercial products [39, 40] as well as possible mistakes.
Bugs 1-5: Access Control Omission In TrustZone, access controls ensure that
trusted/confidential state can only be accessed by the secure world. If access control
checks are left out, security is violated. Wemodel five bugs, which omit access controls
for 1) the control register that partitions main memory between worlds, 2) the main
memory, 3) the debug interface, 4) the L2 cache prefetch buffer, and 5) the L2 cache
blocks. Bug 3 is inspired by a back door in the Actel ProASIC3 [30], Bug 4 models a
vulnerability found in an AMD processor [13], and Bug 5 models a privilege escalation
attack in Intel processors that support SMM mode [40]. Figure 12 shows how omitted
access controls for the partition register are detected. data_in has the label CT when
ns is 0 and PU when ns is 1. The code on line 7 is detected as a bug because the type
system cannot prove that data_in is trusted. The correct code on line 10 adds access
controls to check that the ns bit is 0, implying that data_in is trusted in this context.
Bugs 2-4 are detected and fixed similarly.
Bug 5: Cache Poisoning We emulate and detect a subtle vulnerability found in
Intel processors [40]. The vulnerability allows a user-mode process to execute arbitrary
code in System Management Mode (SMM), the highest privilege level. SMM mode is
only used to execute SMM handlers – interrupt handlers requiring such high privilige.
In the vulnerable processor, the region of physical memory which stores SMM handlers
is protected by access controls in the memory interface. A control register can mark
this region as uncacheable, and it does so by default. However, the control register can
be modified without SMM privilege, allowing an attacker to make the SMM memory
cacheable. Then, the attacker can write to the address of an SMM interrupt handler.
Memory access controls reject the write, but it is cached. Subsequent executions of
the handler address will hit in the cache and execute the attacker’s code. We modeled
this vulnerability in our processor by removing the NS tags and access controls from
the L2 while keeping memory access controls. We added a control register that sets
cacheability for the secure world but can be modified by either world. The bug is
detected because the cache lines can receive data that is from either world, but no
access controls are present.
Bug 6: NS-bit Flip Memory requests are transmitted with an NS bit that indicates
the security level of the request. This bug inverts the NS bit so that a memory request
from a normal-world core is interpreted as a secure-world access. This bug is detected
because flipping an NS bit changes the type of dependently typed variables. In the
network, the input and output data variables both have types that depend on the NS
bit. If the input and output NS bits do not match, the security labels of the input and
output data will also not match causing an error. Even if the bit is flipped in multiple
places, the error will be detected because eventually the input and output types will not
match. This demonstrates the benefit of information flow analysis, which tracks the
propagation of data throughout the design.
Bug 7: Network Routing Bug This bug models a network implementation that
leaks secrets by incorrectly routing a response from the secure-world memory to a
normal-world core. In our TrustZone implementation, the bug is prevented by the
memory response access control checks and the L1 cache tags. To test the bug, we
removed these access controls and used an L1 cache that keeps data from only one
security domain at a time. This bug is detected at the interface between the L1 caches
and the on-chip network. Without access controls at the response ports, the type system
cannot prove that the NS bit of a response matches the NS bit of a cache.
Bug 8: World Switch Bug For a world switch (i.e., context switch) from normal
world to secure world, the processor pipeline must complete all in-flight instructions
before changing the NS bit. Otherwise, in-flight normal-world instructions will execute
with escalated privilege. We model a vulnerable mode switch by omitting the pipeline
drain step. This bug is detected because changing the NS bit causes the labels of
1 // 0x0000-0x8000 is the secure-world memory.
2 // the rest is the normal-world memory.
3
4 // Code common to both bugs
5 wire [0:31] {world(ns)} addrout, addrin;
6 wire [0:31] {world(ns)} datain;
7 reg [0:31] {CT} data_sec;
8 reg [0:31] {PU} data_norm;
9 always@(*) begin
10 if((ns == 0) && (addrout > ’h8000))
11 data_norm = downgrade(datain, PU);
12 else
13 data_sec = datain;
14 end
15 // Bug 9-1: not detected
16 assign addrout = (addrin <= ’h8000) ?
17 addrin + ’h8000 : addrin;
18 // Bug 9-2: detected
19 wire {PU} normal_world_trigger;
20 assign addrout = (normal_world_trigger ?
21 addrin + ’h8000 : addrin;
Figure 13: Bug 9: memory address change bugs.
the dependently typed registers to change. SecVerilogBL prevents label changes from
leaking information by dynamically clearing register contents when labels are changed.
Bug 9: Memory Address Change Bug To understand the limitations of HDL-level
IFC, we constructed two bugs that change the memory address at the memory interface.
Figure 13 illustrates the bugs. In both cases, the address is changed from the secure-
world region to the normal-world region so that a write into secure-world memory gets
stored in normal-world memory. This allows the normal world to read data that should
be stored in the secure-world memory. Bug 9-1 is not detected, because downgrading
allows the secure-world access to write data into the normal-world memory. On the
other hand, Bug 9-2 is detected, because the change in the secure-worldmemory address
is triggered by a normal-world variable (normal_world_trigger). The examples
show that functional bugs in the secure world may lead to undetected bugs through
downgrading, but only if there is no influence from the normal world. Vulnerabilities
that do not affect downgraded variables are always detected.
Other Bugs Hicks et al. [13] proposed SPECS, a run-time bug detector. They
evaluated it by implementing 14 bugs in the OpenRISC processor. The bugs included
privilege escalation, register target/source redirection, interrupt-register contamination,
interrupt disabling, code injection, jump instruction disabling, and others. While we
could not implement those bugs in our processor architecture (e.g., our prototype
does not have protection rings or an MMU), we reviewed the HDL code studied for
SPECS. These bugs all allow a user-mode process to change supervisor-mode variables.
Therefore, these bugs should all be detected by information flow analysis if user-mode
variables are labeled PU and supervisor-mode variables are labeled CT.
6.3 Overhead
Programming Overhead Table 3 shows the number of lines of code for the unverified
version of our processor (Unverified) and the verified version with security labels
Component Unverified Verified Percentage
Top-Level Module 1391 1412 1.5%
Processor 3474 3504 0.86%
L1 Cache 1250 1308 4.6%
Access Control 0 75 N/A
On-chip Network 2122 2557 1.7%
L2 Cache 2976 3093 3.9%
DMA controller 525 549 4.6%
Debug interface 350 369 5.4%
Main memory 974 1015 4.2%
Library Modules 2780 2818 1.4%
Total 16234 16700 2.9%
Table 3: Programming overhead (lines of code).
(Verified). We emphasize that the verification procedure is purely static and and
performed at compile time. However, the implementation changes slightly 1) to add
extra variables specifically for encoding dependent types and 2) to aid the program
analysis phase that estimates the run-time values of dependent types. The code increases
by 2.9%.
Area, Power, and Performance Overheads The processor was synthesized using
Cadence Design Compiler using a standard 90nm library to obtain performance, area,
and power results. We found that the extra code for security verification has no impact on
the maximum clock frequency. Also, there is no CPI difference between the unverified
and verified versions. Therefore, the performance is identical for the unverified and
verified designs. The area and power overheads are negligible (0.37% and 0.32%).
7 Related Work
Secure Hardware Architecture Though this work studied an implementation of Trust-
Zone [20], we believe our methodology is also applicable to other secure architectures
proposed in industry [2, 1, 3] and academia [33, 9, 10, 5]. These architectures are
similar to TrustZone since they also aim to isolate critical software. Information flow
checking can identify violations of strict isolation.
Sinha et al. [29, 28] verify the security of programs which use SGX enclaves to
ensure that hardware security features are used correctly. Gollamudi et al. [12] use
information flow in software to partition programs into TrustZone worlds or SGX
enclaves. This work is complementary to ours, which verifies the hardware security
features.
Information Flow Tracking in Hardware. DIFT [32] is the earliest use of infor-
mation flow tracking in hardware. It applies information flow tracking coarsely at the
architecture level. GLIFT [37, 23, 24, 35, 36, 14] performs information flow analysis on
hardware at the gate level. The earliest GLIFT [37] approach incurs high performance,
area, and energy overheads by inserting additional logic. Later work applies GLIFT
to simulated circuits [23, 24] and avoids overhead in synthesized hardware. Because
simulating every possible state in large designs is infeasible, the approach is used to
check either small designs or only a set of states reachable by particular software that is
designed together with hardware [36]. Oberg et al. [25] propose a technique to separate
timing flows from non-timing flows. Sapper [17], Caisson [18], and SecVerilog [42]
all apply information flow type systems at the hardware description language level.
SecVerilog is used in this work, but our methodology can also be applied to other
secure HDLs.
This study is the first to use information flow at the HDL level to verify a multi-
core security architecture. The processor includes a shared cache, pipelines, a shared
network, a DMA engine, and a debug interface. Other studies have used information
flow to verify simpler hardware. Oberg et al. use GLIFT to verify an I2C hub and
USB controller [24]. Tiwari et al. [36] identify a small, security-critical portion of
a CPU and use StarLogic to verify it. However, the authors do not include shared
un-core components. Previous studies verified hardware designs that enforce strict
noninterference. In contrast, this work solves challenges in enforcing relaxed policies
used in practice. For example, commercial architectures are seldom concerned with
timing attacks [2, 1, 20].
Hardware Security Bugs Countless vulnerabilities have been found in real hard-
ware designs. Manufacturers release errata documents enumerating known bugs [4, 8].
Hicks et al. [13] analyzed 301 bugs from commercial errata documents and found that
28 were security-critical. Wojtczuk et al. [39] found a software-exploitable hardware
vulnerability that allows an attacker to escalate from user-space privilege to a privilege
level above the kernel in an Intel processor. The same authors [40] use faulty DMA
transaction messages to escape VM-isolation in processors that support Intel VT-d. Lee
et al. [15] used uninitialized data vulnerabilities in GPUs to leak data from co-resident
users. Several of these vulnerabilities formed the basis for bugs that we demonstrate
can be detected by SecVerilog.
Language-Level Information Flow Control Language-based information flow
control is a widely studied area [27]. Yet, applying information flow type systems to
hardware description languages is a relatively new research direction, only studied by a
few papers [42, 17, 18]. One important question in IFC HDL designs is how to allow
security domains to share hardware. Sapper [17] inserts dynamic checks that securely
permit sharing, but may induce functional errors at run time. To permit sharing with
purely static checking, SecVerilog [42] uses a dependent type system.
The use of dependent types for accurate tracking of information flow started with
JFlow [21], which uses value-indexed labels. Later systems [38, 43, 16, 22, 19] have
introduced more expressive forms of dependent labels, exploring trade-offs between
needed expressive power and tractability of analysis. For expressive type systems to
be useful in practice, type checking must be tractable and efficient for real-world code.
The per-bit and per-element dependent labels we add to SecVerilog are not supported
by previous dependent type systems for imperative languages. They are an important
feature for future security-typed HDLs because they offer valuable expressive power
while remaining tractable: a sweet spot in the trade-off space. The proposed type system
extensions are also non-trivial because they need to statically and precisely propagate
bit vector labels through bit-level operations that may combine or shift bits.
8 Conclusion
This work shows that the security of anARMTrustZone implementation on amulti-core
processor can be verified at design time using information flow analysis. This study
is the first to verify a complex security architecture with information flow. We found
that static verification of practical security policies on a multi-core introduces new
technical challenges, and show how to solve them through novel type system extensions
and the addition of simple, inexpensive run-time hardware checks. This verification
methodology provides strong assurance that the processor provides secure isolation for
critical software.
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